A polyester company rooted in Jiangyin for over four decades stands on the brink of delisting. Sanfangxiang's 2025 annual report received an 'adverse opinion' and an internal control negative opinion, triggering a dual delisting risk warning. Behind it lie three consecutive years of cumulative losses totaling 1.628 billion yuan and the judicial auction of controlling shareholder shares. This is not an isolated case, but a microcosm of severe overcapacity and squeezed margins in the PTA-PET bottle chip chain.
The Price of Overcapacity
Industry data shows that from 2023 to 2024, domestic PET bottle chip capacity surged past 20 million tons/year, while downstream demand stood at only about 12 million tons/year. This 8-million-ton gap directly eroded product spreads. As the second-largest producer, Sanfangxiang acquired Hailun Chemical for 7.35 billion yuan in 2020, shifting its focus to bottle-grade PET chips and PTA, and followed up with aggressive capacity expansion. The result: capacity rose, but profits reversed—from 2023 to 2025, the company lost 287 million, 487 million, and 885 million yuan respectively, with losses widening each year.
This means that in a severely oversupplied track, scale expansion is no moat but an accelerator of losses. Sanfangxiang's value chain covers only the PTA-to-PET chip link, with its core raw material PX entirely outsourced. Once upstream PX prices rise, the company's weak cost control becomes a glaring vulnerability. In 2025, its trading revenue plunged 59.97% year-on-year, a direct consequence of this single-structure fragility.
Chain Reaction of Guarantee Defaults and Related-Party Risks
Beyond core business losses, Sanfangxiang faces a chain of guarantee defaults. As of the latest announcement, cumulative overdue debts guaranteed by the company for its subsidiaries reached 522 million yuan, accounting for 10.82% of its latest audited net assets. Among them, a 25.64 million yuan lease payment from subsidiary Hailun Petrochemical to Taiping石化 Financial Leasing went unpaid, and the company provided irrevocable joint liability guarantees.
More alarming is the related-party transaction risk. By the end of fiscal 2025, the company's accounts receivable from related parties stood at 3.561 billion yuan, yet only 107 million yuan in bad debt provisions had been made. Auditors explicitly stated they could not obtain sufficient evidence on the recoverability of these amounts. The controlling shareholder's shares have been frozen, and if judicial disposal proceeds, actual control may change hands. This combination of 'high receivables + guarantee defaults' is a classic trigger for capital chain rupture in the chemical fiber industry downturn.
Can Anti-Involution Policies Bring a Turnaround?
In H2 2025, national authorities convened a symposium with major PTA and PET bottle chip producers, targeting 'involutionary competition.' Against the backdrop of supply-demand mismatch and thin margins, the meeting was seen as a signal of policy intervention. Sanfangxiang reported a net profit of 32.74 million yuan in Q1 2026, returning to profitability, while geopolitical factors like the Strait of Hormuz blockade boosted polyester chain product prices and margins.
But profitability does not mean the alarm has been lifted. In June 2026, Lianhe Credit Rating downgraded Sanfangxiang's long-term credit rating to A- with a negative outlook. Although the controlling shareholder's share auction was temporarily suspended due to execution objections, the unresolved judicial risk remains a Damocles sword. For buyers and foreign trade firms, Sanfangxiang's case highlights a critical lesson: before capacity is fully cleared, collaborating with single-link, high-leverage suppliers requires more rigorous credit assessment.