A veteran polyester leader founded in 1980 now stands at the brink of delisting. Sanfangxiang's 2025 annual report received a 'disclaimer of opinion' and an 'adverse internal control opinion', triggering dual delisting risk warnings, while its controlling shareholder's shares are under judicial auction. This giant, which once swallowed Hailun Chemical in a 'snake-eats-elephant' deal to become the second-largest polyester bottle chip producer, has accumulated total losses of 1.628 billion yuan over three consecutive years, with losses widening annually. This is not an isolated case but a microcosm of severe overcapacity in the polyester bottle chip industry.
The Harsh Ledger of Overcapacity
Industry public data shows that from 2023 to 2024, domestic polyester bottle chip capacity surged, exceeding 20 million tons per year, while demand was only about 12 million tons per year—a gap of over 8 million tons. Product spreads shrank continuously, eroding corporate profits in the 'involution' battle. After acquiring Hailun Chemical in 2020, Sanfangxiang shifted its main business to bottle-grade polyester chips and PTA, posting profits of 630 million yuan in 2021 and 818 million yuan in 2022, but then plummeted from 2023 onward, losing 487 million yuan in 2024 and 885 million yuan in 2025. Its trading revenue fell 59.97% year-on-year to 1.713 billion yuan in 2025, further confirming market contraction.
More critically, its industrial chain layout is too narrow. Sanfangxiang covers only the PTA-to-bottle chip segment, with core raw material PX heavily dependent on external purchases. Once upstream PX prices rise, its weak cost-control capability is exposed, squeezing margins to near zero. This contrasts sharply with integrated players covering 'PX-PTA-polyester-textiles', making single-segment firms the first to suffer in price wars.
Chain Reactions in Debt
Beyond losses, overdue guarantees pose another risk. As of the latest announcement, cumulative overdue debts guaranteed by Sanfangxiang for its subsidiaries reached 522 million yuan, accounting for 10.82% of the latest audited net assets. Among them, a subsidiary Hailun Petrochemical failed to pay 25.6376 million yuan in rent to Taiping石化 Financial Leasing, for which the company provided irrevocable joint liability guarantees. By end-2025, accounts receivable from related parties stood at 3.561 billion yuan, with only 107 million yuan in bad debt provisions—auditors explicitly stated they could not obtain sufficient evidence for recoverability. The controlling shareholder's shares are under judicial freeze, and any disposal could trigger a change in control. Lianhe Credit Rating downgraded the company's long-term credit rating to A- with a negative outlook in June 2026.
These numbers reveal a tightening cash flow chain. Overdue guarantees may trigger cross-defaults; if related-party receivables cannot be recovered, net assets will be further eroded. For buyers and trading partners, this means significantly higher counterparty credit risk.
Policy Inflection Point: Anti-Involution
The industry turning point came in the second half of 2025. National authorities held a symposium with PTA and bottle chip leading enterprises, discussing industry operations and projects under construction. Against the backdrop of supply-demand mismatch and thin margins, the symposium was seen as a key measure to prevent 'involution-style' competition and promote stable industry operation—essentially government intervention to guide capacity reduction and orderly competition.
Policy effects appeared in Q1 2026: Sanfangxiang reported net profit of 32.7409 million yuan, turning profitable year-on-year. Meanwhile, geopolitical factors like the Strait of Hormuz blockade drove price rebounds in the polyester chain, improving margins. The stock price temporarily escaped the 1-yuan delisting threshold. However, whether the turnaround is sustainable depends on capacity elimination progress and demand recovery.