On July 6, 2026, a routine promotion by polyester plants pushed the average sales-to-production ratio of polyester filament sample enterprises to 153.8%. The figure looks impressive, but it masks a stark reality: international oil prices have fallen back to pre-Spring Festival levels, customers are using crude oil charts to pressure fabric mills for lower prices, and fabric mills themselves are caught in a dilemma caused by the upstream's 'promotional price cuts.'
The Polyester Plant's 'Volume-for-Profit' Logic
Upstream polyester plants are clear: they prefer production cuts over low-price sales. Industry data shows current capacity utilization at around 70%, maintaining a per-ton profit margin of about 500 yuan. If they cut prices to boost volume, margins could plummet to 100 yuan—and that's only on paper, because existing inventory was produced using higher-priced raw materials, making actual costs much higher than current paper costs.
The deeper context is that the polyester industry has just begun to benefit from 'anti-involution.' After years of endless price wars that eroded all profits, companies now prefer to defend price floors, even at the cost of sacrificing capacity, rather than repeat the 'sell more, lose more' trap. This strategy is particularly evident in July's off-season: promotions appear to be concessions, but they are actually small, cautious steps with limited price cuts.
The Weaving End's Wait-and-See Gamble
Downstream weaving enterprises are reacting with even more complexity. The polyester price cuts did not trigger a buying frenzy—the previous promotion saw only a 70% sales ratio, reflecting fragile market confidence. The customer psychology is: 'If prices dropped, they might drop further,' leading to continued wait-and-see behavior.
July is traditionally the stocking season for autumn/winter fabrics, but this year is different. Last year's production cuts were due to inventory overhang; this year, they are driven by fear of cost volatility. Raw material prices are swinging wildly, and no one dares to increase exposure. Current weaving capacity utilization is already low, so actual demand for raw materials is limited. The promotional sales spike looks more like a 'restocking bounce' than genuine demand recovery.
More critically, weaving enterprises now face a gamble: will demand recover in the second half? In an optimistic scenario, low inventories meet peak season, fabric prices rebound quickly, and stocks turn into profit. In a pessimistic scenario, prices remain flat or fall further, and the more they produce now, the more they lose later. This forces many companies to turn capacity decisions into a bet—gambling that the products they make now will suddenly become popular in the second half.
The Transmission Gridlock and H2 Outlook
Across the entire supply chain, a classic 'cost-kill transmission gridlock' is unfolding: falling oil prices → customers demand lower fabric prices → fabric mills demand lower polyester prices → polyester plants respond with promotions → weaving mills remain cautious. Every link is trying to protect its own margin, but the result is further liquidity contraction.
Industry data indicates that order volumes are at an annual low, but opportunities remain. The probability of demand recovery in H2 is still there, but it depends on inventory levels and product mix. If companies can stock up at reasonable costs during this off-season and switch product lines before the peak season, they may still capture the turnaround. But blindly following promotional restocking could trap them in a 'restock more, lose more' cycle.
